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For much of the 20th century, vulnerability to deprivations of health has often been deﬁned by geographical and
economic factors. Those in wealthy, usually ‘Northern’ and ‘Western’, parts of the world have beneﬁted from
infrastructures, and accidents of geography and climate, which insulate them from many serious threats to
health. Conversely, poorer people are typically exposed to more threats to health, and have lesser access to the
infrastructures needed to safeguard them against the worst consequences of such exposure. However, in recent
years the increasingly globalized nature of the world’s economy, society and culture, combined with anthropo-
genic climate change and the evolution of antibiotic resistance, has begun to shift the boundaries that previ-
ously deﬁned the categories of person threatened by many exogenous threats to health. In doing so, these
factors expose both new and forgotten similarities between persons, and highlight the need for global coopera-
tive responses to the existential threats posed by climate change and the evolution of antimicrobial resistance. In
this article, we argue that these emerging health threats, in demonstrating the similarities that exist between
even distant persons, provides a catalyst for global solidarity, which justiﬁes, and provides motivation for, the
establishment of solidaristic, cooperative global health infrastructures.
Introduction and Background
Vulnerability to the harms caused by exogenous health
threats (EHTs), such as infectious diseases and environ-
mental pollutants, has historically been largely defined
by two factors: wealth and geographical location. These
features created a global health paradigm in which
wealthy people, usually in the global ‘West’ and
‘North’, enjoyed protection from such threats as a
result of accidents of climate and geography, combined
with access to health promoting and preserving infra-
structures (Semenza and Menne, 2009: 368).
Conversely, as a result of the same contingent factors
which benefitted the wealthy, poorer people are exposed
to a wider range of EHTs, and have less access to the
prophylactic and therapeutic goods needed to safeguard
them against the worst consequences of such exposure
(Farmer, 1999: 11, 21). However, emerging realities are
reshaping these distinctions. Globalization, anthropo-
genic climate change and the accelerated evolution of
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) are redefining who is
and is not vulnerable to a wide range of serious threats
to health. In doing so, they have instigated a shift in the
global health paradigm, from one characterized by dif-
ferences in exposure to harm, to one in which all persons
are increasingly united in their vulnerability to emerging
threats.
While these factors mean that public health is increas-
ingly conceptualized as a global public good (Chen
et al., 1999; Eckenwiler et al., 2012: 389; Illingworth
and Parmet, 2015: 157; Widdows and Marway, 2015:
123), public and policy responses to this paradigm
shift in global health have tended to retain (perhaps
subconscious) perceptions that there is a sharp delinea-
tion between the wealthy and safe ‘us’, and the poor and
vulnerable ‘them’ (Widdows, 2015).1 In this article we
argue that not only are such assumptions mistaken, but
that they impede effective global public health policy,
and endanger even the citizens of wealthy countries,
who have previously enjoyed the benefits of ‘healthful’
environments.2 In making this claim, we also argue that
the healthful environments historically enjoyed by the
wealthy, in which EHTs3 are controlled to a reasonable
extent, can no longer be treated as regional or national
goods. Instead, we argue that they must be acknowl-
edged as aspects of a global health paradigm, demanding
global cooperative action to establish and maintain. We
also suggest that while existing responses to this para-
digm shift in global public health are inadequate, the
realities of the shift itself may actually motivate the
kinds of actions necessary to respond effectively to
these new hazards. Our goal in this article is largely
pragmatic, and we certainly do not mean to suggest
that the moral status of persons does not provide
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moral reasons to act on their behalf. Rather, our aim is
to provide an argument which will complement moral
justifications for improvements to global health infra-
structure, and which will appeal to those who do not
recognize the normative force of classical cosmopolitan
arguments for such improvements.
Underlying our argument is an account of solidarity
we have developed in the past (Prainsack and Buyx,
2011, 2012a, 2016).4 We start the article by briefly intro-
ducing the account and the importance of solidarity for
justice and the delivery of public health and social in-
frastructure. We close with a discussion of some of the
key barriers to establishing solidarity at the global scale,
and sketch out a number of implications for future
policy.
Deﬁning Solidarity
In our earlier work, solidarity has been defined as an
‘enacted commitment to carry “costs” (financial,
social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others with
whom a person or persons recognise similarity in a rele-
vant respect’ (Prainsack and Buyx, 2016). It is not
enough therefore merely to feel empathy with other per-
sons; to be in solidarity with them is to act on their
behalf, and accept costs, for example, in the form of
additional financial contributions to provide accessible
health care, or to accept restrictions on freedoms to
consume scarce resources, to benefit them. In addition,
such willingness to incur costs to benefit other per-
sons is based on an identification of relevant similarity
with those other persons ‘in a particular context’
(Prainsack and Buyx, 2011: 49–50).5 Similarity can be
found in a range of shared personal features, interests or
goals, which may be transient or more stable, such as the
shared inconvenience as a result of a delayed flight
(Prainsack and Buyx, 2011: xiv), or membership of re-
ligious, cultural or national groups (Rorty, 1989: 192).
Further, agents who recognize solidarity with others
stand in symmetrical relationships as between equals, at
least regarding the shared situation, interest or goal.
Solidarity is not enacted in unilateral, top down or char-
itable relationships. This account is in line with recent
works on solidarity which state that it is a necessary,
motivational precondition for the fulfillment of the de-
mands of justice (Krishnamurthy, 2013: 133; Scholz,
2008: 78). Solidarity also presumes a relational, socially
and environmentally embedded understanding of the
person.6 However, such an understanding is often not
acknowledged explicitly, particularly in the context of
public health.7
Solidarity within and between groups is also an often
implicit prerequisite for the delivery and maintenance of
important social infrastructures, such as the rule of law,
and public health programmes, since they rely on co-
operative action in the form of participation in taxation
programmes and social norms, from all members of the
relevant group. In the context of public health, acknowl-
edging solidarity with other persons therefore provides
the basis for cooperative endeavours to deliver and
maintain important health public goods.
However, solidarity for global public health has his-
torically been elusive, in large part because of dominant
social narratives which emphasize relationships with
fellow group members over those with distant others.8
It is argued, for example, that solidaristic identification
is easier within limited groups, and amongst persons
who are relatively close to one another (Reichlin,
2011: 368), and that ‘our sense of solidarity is strongest
when those with whom solidarity is expressed are
thought of as “one of us,” where “us” means something
smaller and more local than the human race’ (Rorty,
1989: 191).
Where intra-group solidarity is the basis for the de-
livery of important social goods, inter-group solidarity,
even at the regional level, remains elusive, and even
more so globally. Many are sceptical of our ability to
identify solidaristically with all members of the human
species in virtue of our shared, innate humanity (Hurst
et al., 2009: 92; Eckenwiler et al., 2012: 383; Gould,
2014: chapter 5).9 However, rather than deriving soli-
darity from universal, innate features of humanity, we
argue that we should understand solidarity as enacted
practices that are based on concrete recognition of simi-
larity in a given specific context. Instead of being tied to,
and emergent from, pre-existing groups and their in-
ternal solidarity norms, such solidarity can therefore
be ‘project-related’ (Rippe, 1998: 355), or based on
other contingent features of persons (Rorty, 1989:
191). Consequently, the range of contingent factors
that should be acknowledged as being of normative sig-
nificance expands significantly. That is, the move from
‘them’ to ‘us’ (Widdows, 2015) is a shift in perception of
what the most relevant features of persons are—from
pre-existing and often locally determined factors such as
‘tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like’ (Rorty, 1989:
192), to commonalities that can range from specific
shared goals or experiences, to entrenched shared situ-
ations of oppression, or common elements of risks and
dangers from EHTs.
As we argue in the following sections, changes to the
global health paradigm, or rather, to the global distri-
bution of EHTs, may provide the stimulus needed to
2  WEST-ORAM AND BUYX
 at U
B K
iel on M
ay 7, 2016
http://phe.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
encourage states, and individuals, to recognize relevant
similarities between distant persons and groups, and
respond to the solidaristic relationships that exist be-
tween them appropriately.
Two Shifts in the Global Health
Paradigm
Numerous emerging global health threats, of which we
discuss two below, provide an exemplary motivator to
wealthy countries to expand the range of persons
included in their solidary group—that is, the commu-
nity of persons with whom they feel similarity. Where
wealthy countries have traditionally emphasized bene-
fiting their own citizens, and in doing so have imposed
significant costs on other persons (Krishnamurthy and
Herder, 2013: 273), the threat posed to rich and poor
alike by emerging global health threats should motivate
wealthy nations to expand the range of persons with
whose interests they are concerned.10 This can be
demonstrated with reference to two examples.
Shift One: Antimicrobial Resistance
The evolution of AMR increases risks associated with
existing diseases amongst those already at risk (the
poor), and exposes new populations (the rich) to threats
from which they had previously been protected—with a
potential global impact of an additional 10 million
deaths attributable to AMR each year by 2050 (The
Review on Antimicrobial Resistance Chaired by Jim
O’Neill, 2015: 5). For those in wealthy countries, the
emergence of drug resistance effectively poses an entirely
new category of threat, since they have previously
enjoyed access to effective treatment for almost all bac-
terial infections. With the exception of the frail and the
immune-deficient, death from bacterial infectious dis-
ease had become the exception since the introduction of
antibiotics after the Second World War. This has chan-
ged (Viens and Littmann, 2015). The evolution of anti-
microbial resistant bacteria means that infectious disease
has again become a very real threat—one which can be
very difficult or even impossible to treat (Byarugaba,
2004; European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control & European Medicines Agency, 2009: 1-2).
There have been many outbreaks of multi-resistant
strains in wealthy countries in recent years, with signifi-
cant fatalities (Reardon, 2014).11 Thus, for residents of
rich Western countries, suffering from an infectious dis-
ease without effective treatment available is rapidly
changing from the fate of the distant poor to something
that could affect one’s partner, parent or child.
Shift Two: Climate Change
Like AMR, anthropogenic climate change is increasingly
exposing wealthy persons to health hazards which had
previously primarily affected people in poor countries.
The harms caused by climate change are inflicted ei-
ther directly, through the increased frequency and se-
verity of extreme weather events such as heat waves
(Vandentorren et al., 2004), or indirectly, by contribut-
ing to the expansion of habitats suitable for disease vec-
tors (McMichael et al., 1996: 7).12 Both are major
sources of harms to persons in both rich and poor coun-
tries (McMichael, 2013: 1340). For example, a heat wave
led to approximately 70,000 heat-related deaths in
Western and Central Europe in 2003, while in 2010
Russia experienced approximately 55,000 heat-related
deaths (Barriopedro et al., 2011: 220). These data are
particularly disturbing in light of predictions that the
extremes of temperature which led to these deaths
could occur as regularly as every 2 years in Southern
Europe, North and South America, Africa, and
Indonesia by 2050 (Russo et al., 2014: 12500).
In addition, health can also be adversely affected in-
directly by global climate change. For example, rising
global temperatures affect ozone-related mortality—
one study has predicted that climate change will increase
ozone-related ‘acute mortality’ across the New York
Metropolitan Area by 4.5 per cent by 2050 (Knowlton
et al., 2004: 1557). Increases in global temperature are
also predicted to significantly expand the habitable
range for a number of vector organisms, meaning that
diseases formerly restricted to poorer countries in the
Global South are ‘migrating’ North (Enserink, 2007).
This includes Malaria, Dengue fever, West Nile fever
and Chikungunya (Semenza and Menne, 2009: 366–
367).13 Similarly, rising ocean temperatures have
increased the habitable range for the marine bacteria
Vibrio vulnificus and Vibrio parahaemolyticus, leading
to more human infections in a wider range of geograph-
ical locations (Burge et al., 2014: 262–263). Fatality rates
from Vibrio infections are greater than 50 per cent, and
infections have been found as far North as the Baltic Sea
(Baker-Austin et al., 2013: 73), and Alaska (Martinez-
Urtaza et al., 2010: 1781).
The harms inflicted by climate change will not affect
all people equally. Already vulnerable people are likely to
be more severely harmed because of their pre-existing
vulnerabilities, and because the wealthy have more re-
sources available to protect them. However, like the
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emergence of AMR, the hazards associated with climate
change represent a paradigm shift in the health context
previously enjoyed by all persons, even those in wealthy
countries. The increased frequency of extreme tempera-
ture events expose the citizens of wealthy countries to
dangers which they have not previously experienced on
such a huge scale, and show how vulnerability to ex-
treme weather scenarios is not something experienced
only by those in poor countries. Therefore, like AMR,
climate change poses a very real threat to the health and
well-being of wealthy people. In doing so, it contributes
to the paradigm shift in global health with which we are
concerned in this article.
New Realities of Global Health
The evolution of AMR, expansion of vector habitats and
the threat posed by climate change serve to ‘democra-
tise’ the threat posed by many serious threats to health.
These threats, and public awareness of them in wealthy
countries, are compounded by the effects of globaliza-
tion. Where previously, for example, it may have been
possible for the citizens of wealthy countries to remain
unaware of the harms caused by infectious disease in
distant countries, contributing to the sense of distance
between rich and poor persons, virtually instantaneous
electronic communication forces information about
outbreaks of infectious disease into the public con-
sciousness in wealthy countries, thereby helping to over-
come lack of awareness as a barrier to solidarity between
the citizens of rich and poor countries. Similarly, rapid
air travel also contributes to the spread of infectious
disease to parts of the world which had previously
been unaffected (Mangili and Gendreau, 2005), mean-
ing that distant persons are now intimately involved in
the lives of people thousands of miles away.
Now more than ever, ‘infectious diseases . . . know no
borders’ (Battin et al., 2009: 34). Indeed, the recent cases
of Ebola in wealthy countries during the 2014–2015
Ebola epidemic provide one example of international
transmission through human vectors (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2014, BBC News,
2015). Further, as the treatment options available to
the wealthy become more limited as a result of AMR,
they increasingly share with the global poor common
vulnerability to diseases from which they had previously
been protected.14 While the persistently vulnerable poor
are likely to continue to be at greater risk than their
wealthier counterparts, these factors expose the wealthy
to hazards that in the antibiotic era they have previously
been able to avoid. In doing so, they highlight a
re-emerging and novel common feature between rich
and poor—real vulnerability to serious EHTs.15
Global Responses to Global
Threats
These emerging global threats to health challenge—both
individually and collectively—the global health paradigm
in which vulnerability to EHTs is unequally distributed,
with the wealthy largely living in ‘healthful environ-
ments’, whilst the poor are significantly more exposed
to health threats. These changes mean that such healthful
environments are no longer sustainable as distinct local or
regional public goods.16 The impacts of the abovemen-
tioned health public ‘bads’ (Illingworth and Parmet,
2015: 152) are global in scope, and cannot be resisted
by purely regional responses—isolationism is no longer
a viable domestic public health strategy (Widdows,
2015).17 Instead, wealthy nations must acknowledge the
global reach of factors which may have previously ap-
peared to be safely distant, and respond appropriately.
Any successful domestic public health response to the
novel threats must acknowledge that the preservation of
domestic or regional public health is reliant on the suc-
cessful promotion of global public health. Antibiotic re-
sistance and climate change do not respect borders, nor
can they be addressed in a regionally limited fashion
(Viens and Littmann, 2015). While restricting responses
to global health threats to the regional scale can provide
limited protection to those in protected zones, doing so
allows for the persistence of ‘reservoirs of infection’, which
will continue to pose a significant threat to all persons
(Battin et al., 2009: 12, 35).18 Equally, there is no domes-
tic or regional policy action which can offer an effect-
ive long-term response to climate change in isolation
from cooperative efforts from all other regional actors
(Moellendorf, 2011: 62). Consequently, any domestic
public health policy cannot focus exclusively on local
interests, since those interests are themselves dependent
on global factors. All nations must therefore treat domestic
public health policy, at least regarding these health threats,
as one aspect of wider global policy. What are needed are
cooperative global responses which acknowledge the simi-
larities and solidarities that exist between all persons.
Shared Elements of Vulnerability
as a Source of Solidarity
The emergence of these global hazards highlights im-
portant points of similarity between citizens of rich
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and poor countries where previously difference and dis-
tance had been assumed. Correlatively, the global and
public nature of the goods and services needed to pro-
tect all persons, even the wealthy, from these newly
common vulnerabilities, draws attention to the need
for cooperative action between all, or at least most, in-
dividual and state actors.
However, it must be acknowledged that the dangers
faced by members of these two groups, rich and poor,
are neither equal nor identical (Mendelsohn et al., 2006;
Wheeler and von Braun, 2013). Those earlier mentioned
accidents of geography and climate, in conjunction with
the presence of effective health promoting infrastruc-
tures and institutions in wealthy countries, mean that
despite the dangers that climate change and AMR pose
to the rich, the poor will remain more vulnerable to the
threats posed by the realities of the emerging global
health paradigm. While the rich will become more vul-
nerable than they previously had been as a result of this
shift in the global health paradigm, they will still enjoy
greater protection from harm than the poor.
However, while it is true that important inequalities
in vulnerability between rich and poor will remain, the
relevant differences in vulnerability for the purposes of
our argument are not between rich and poor in a new
global health paradigm, but are instead between the
status of the rich prior to the advent of this new para-
digm, and their status after it. While the rich are likely to
remain better off than the poor, they will, overall, be
substantially worse off than they had been.
The hazards that characterize the emerging global
health paradigm provide a vivid demonstration of
the vulnerabilities and harms currently endured by the
poor, and show how they may also easily endanger
the wealthy. While truly common vulnerability will
remain elusive under a new global health paradigm,
the risks faced by rich and poor alike may be
‘common-enough’ to motivate solidaristic cooperation
in response to global threats.
A coordinated response to the hazards of the new
global health threat paradigm can thus arguably be
motivated out of fear of the consequences of failure to
act effectively.19 Fear, arising as a result of the new vul-
nerabilities experienced by the wealthy, may therefore
provide motivation to acknowledge previously ignored,
and re-emerging, similarities with distant others. It also
gives all persons compelling reasons to engage in soli-
daristic cooperation with those distant others to ad-
equately respond to the emerging global health threats
discussed above. Put more positively, greater awareness
of our similarities with distant others, arising out of
increased knowledge of some common vulnerabilities
to serious risk of harm, and the fear associated with
such knowledge, may provide the basis of recognition
of shared interests in cooperatively promoting health for
all persons. In turn, this should motivate the citizens of
wealthy states—and in consequence, their shared insti-
tutions—to assume costs to cooperate with those with
whom they recognize similarity, and truly and earnestly
strive to preserve and establish healthful environments
for all.
Doing so requires an important shift away from
global health initiatives that are based on charity to-
wards solidarity-based initiatives. When populations
are asked to help and support others who are threatened
by natural disasters or illnesses far away, without any
recognition of similarity, such help is usually based on
asymmetric charity. A shift from charity to solidarity has
important impacts on how equitable the relationships
are between those helping and those being helped.
Charity is based on a difference—donors give benefici-
aries something they lack, because donors are richer,
more privileged, etc., because their beneficiaries are vul-
nerable, poor, etc. Here, despite whatever donor and
beneficiary may share in common, it is what sets them
apart that underpins charitable practices. Charitable re-
lationships are therefore, almost by definition, unequal.
Solidarity relationships—as far as the solidaristic prac-
tice goes—are more equal (in the concrete situation in
which they take place). The recognition of similarity
entails an acknowledgment that donors are, at least in
this relevant respect, in a symmetric and equal relation-
ship with those they help (Prainsack and Buyx, 2016).
This, in turn, leads to the delivery of aid that is less likely
be imperialistic (Hayter, 1971: 5; Ooms and
Hammonds, 2008: 157; Moyo and Manyeruke, 2015),
demeaning (King et al., 2014: 3) or patronizing (Pisani,
2008: 192) in the way some charitable aid has been
accused of being.20 Indeed, recognizing similarity with
those helped demands that donors take a collaborative
and inclusive approach, and that they do not exclude or
discriminate against particular groups for irrelevant rea-
sons (Krishnamurthy, 2013). Finally, recognition by
donors of solidarity with their beneficiaries—as fellows
sharing some risks, threats and common interests—
makes it more likely that they will be willing to incur
higher costs to establish and preserve commonly needed
goods.
There are examples of this thinking penetrating the
policy world. A recent report commissioned by the
British Government on the problem of AMR (The
Review on Antimicrobial Resistance Chaired by Jim
O’Neill, 2015), for instance, has an explicitly global
focus, and repeatedly emphasizes the need for a global,
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cooperative response to the forthcoming crisis. We take
this example to support our argument that these new
threats are likely to encourage the recognition that
global solidaristic cooperation is needed to respond ef-
fectively to them at the global scale.
Solidarity and Health for All: How
to Get There
The realities of the emerging global health paradigm give
compelling reasons for wealthy countries to discard in-
adequate public health policies based on regional inter-
ests and assumptions of distance and difference from
their poorer and more distant neighbours. In their
place, we have argued that global, solidaristic,
approaches to public health should be adopted.
However, it has also been noted that such expectations
might be misguided or naive, because in past situations
of crisis, such as the recent Ebola epidemic, ‘practices
geared toward protecting national self-interest were
again adopted rather than accepting shared responsibil-
ities’ (Smith and Upshur, 2015: 8).
We acknowledge the general point of the difficulty in
implementing solidaristic practices in the real world.
However, our argument here is broader and in fact in-
cludes the self-interest of wealthy nations as one of the
important prerequisites for future policy change. In fact,
much of the force of our argument set out above is
derived from an appeal to the self-interest of wealthy
countries—to protect their own citizens from harm
they must also respond to the needs and interests of
distant others. However, we do not mean to suggest
that actions which are purely self-interested represent
instances of solidarity. Rather, self-interest in this par-
ticular context serves as a motivational starting point
from which solidarity can be developed.21
Self-interested motivations to act cooperatively with
distant others are based on recognition of similarity in
an important aspect with those distant others—to co-
operate with others out of self-interest in response to a
shared danger is to recognize that threats to others are
also threats to oneself.22 This recognition of similarity is
the catalyst which reminds us of our own relationality
(Baylis et al., 2008); of the ways in which persons are in
solidarity with one another; and sheds light on new,
emerging ways in which solidary relationships obtain
between persons. In doing so, it forms the basis of soli-
daristic cooperation. Self-interest therefore represents
only a first, yet important, step towards solidaristic co-
operation in response to a common danger, in that it
serves to highlight those similarities between persons
which may previously have been obscured by the as-
sumptions of difference which characterize the indi-
vidualist, statist international system.
It has been noted that while self-interest provides
compelling grounds for responding to the health
needs of all persons, at least in response to communic-
able diseases, self-interest ‘works less well for non-com-
municable diseases (NCDs)’ (Widdows, 2015), a point
which can also be made about injuries. However, while
self-interest may not be able to directly motivate cooper-
ation to ensure the provision of aid for NCDs, injuries
and similar conditions, the solidarity it engenders in
other areas of public health provision can serve as a
foundation upon which to build more general responses
to global health needs.
That is, from self-interested motivations for global
solidarity in response to particular shared vulnerabilities,
it is possible that a more inclusive, and more expansive,
global health policy agenda may be developed. Put differ-
ently, currently wealthy countries, their citizens and in-
stitutions regularly ignore many of the harms suffered by
the citizens of poor countries. However, the changes to
the global health paradigm discussed above could lead
these agents to the initial recognition of particular dan-
gers which they share with the citizens of poor countries
(or rather, that some elements of that danger are directly
relevant to both rich and poor populations).23 Through
engaging with this particular threat, reporting on it and
exploring ways to minimize it for their own benefit, rich
populations will be made aware of the harms suffered by
formerly unknown distant strangers.
Equally, through engagement with these new threats,
wealthy populations will become more aware of those
distant strangers with whom some of the risks are
shared. It is therefore reasonable to expect that through
this engagement, other similarities, such as common
elements of threats and shared interests, can emerge
which can lead to further grounds for solidarity. At
least some of these instances of, and grounds for, soli-
darity can realistically be expected to be quite broad. For
example, wealthy countries may respond to the threat of
a particular pandemic disease out of a self-interested
desire to protect their own citizens. However, in doing
so it is plausible to suggest that through engaging co-
operatively with the governments and citizens of poor
countries in response to this particular shared threat, it
may emerge that there is a broader common interest in
having strong public health institutions in vulnerable
countries, since these protect everyone most effectively
(Boozary et al., 2014: 1859).
6  WEST-ORAM AND BUYX
 at U
B K
iel on M
ay 7, 2016
http://phe.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Cooperative action in response to a given pandemic
disease threat will almost inevitably raise awareness of
the health needs of the citizens of the aided countries
(Caplan, 2014), and highlight the existence of a relation-
ship between the citizens of rich and poor countries,
which is not defined by charitable ‘donor/beneficiary’
roles. Instead, cooperative responses to shared threats
provide examples of how common threats were fought
together for mutual benefit. Given such shared efforts,
and recognition of shared interests, it is likely that mo-
tivation to support the establishment of public health
institutions can be expected to be at least better than
before. We thus move from solidaristic cooperation in
one particular respect, to solidarity in others—a move
which exemplifies what Kolenda has described as ‘incre-
mental solidarity’ (1989: 43). To illustrate, initial re-
sponses by wealthy nations to the 2015 Ebola outbreak
in West Africa began as a response to a particular crisis
but developed into recognition of the wider health needs
of a vulnerable group, even though the response to those
needs was predicated on a concern about the re-emer-
gence of a threat to the health of those in other countries
(Boozary et al., 2014: 1859). In practical terms, then,
and with regard to global health threats, this requires a
significant reframing of global responses—away from
‘charitable foreign aid’ towards solidaristic practice
that focuses on alleviating common threats.
The Costs of Solidarity for Global
Health
Existing policy approaches to global public health in the
face of these impending public health disasters are
(where they even exist) inadequate.24 In part this is be-
cause they are based on a nation- or region-specific in-
terpretation of who counts as worthy of moral
concern—and a failure to recognize increasingly
common vulnerabilities to emerging threats. The risks
associated by the emerging global health hazards men-
tioned above provide compelling reasons for all persons
to engage in solidaristic cooperation through their in-
stitutions to adequately protect their own health.
However, this has the potential to be extremely
costly—in several senses of the term. The need to con-
trol carbon emissions may necessitate drastic reductions
in air travel, industrial meat production (Aiking, 2014:
483 s) or the use of personal motor vehicles for example
(Stanley et al., 2011). Correlatively, ensuring effective
global responses to the threat of infectious disease may
entail the provision of costly infrastructure to poor
countries, which may impose high financial costs on
the wealthy (Butler and Morello, 2014; Bartsch et al.,
2015: 5–7; Mullan, 2015: e423). Similarly, the economic
impact of reducing carbon emissions and the cost of
renewable energy infrastructure may be impossible for
poor countries to sustain, or may hinder economic de-
velopment so much that future adequate investment in
public health is not possible (Ellis et al., 2009: vii),
meaning that yet further costs, such as the provision
of financial incentives and assistance to poor countries,
may have to be met by wealthy countries (Baer et al.,
2008: 13). Efforts to limit the evolution of AMR may
entail the imposition of stricter global and local controls
on the use of antibiotics, imposing greater burdens, and
even harms, on rich-country patients. Limiting access to
antibiotics for example may lead to increases in mortal-
ity and morbidity from otherwise treatable diseases
(Littmann and Viens, 2015: 6, Littmann et al., 2015).
The costs of adequate, cooperative and solidaristic,
responses to the emerging global health threats men-
tioned will be huge. However, the costs of failing to
act will almost certainly be far greater. Further, these
costs of failure no longer affect distant strangers, with
rich donors having only abstract worries over potential
risks. Instead, they pose an existential threat to all per-
sons. In addition, the high costs and direct dangers of
failure highlight the inadequacies of historical global
health policy, and the need to acknowledge the role of
global public goods in promoting individual and re-
gional health.
Conclusions
We have argued in this article that adequate responses to
emerging global health threats necessitate a paradigm
shift in the way in which we approach global public
health. We argued that self-interest provides a compel-
ling starting point for solidarity between the citizens of
rich and poor countries, because the recognition of
similarity in the form of shared vulnerabilities to emer-
ging health threats can catalyse solidaristic cooperation.
And only through such solidaristic cooperation can
anyone be protected from the dangers posed by the
emerging global health threats.
It could be objected that based as it is on the self-
interest of wealthy nations, this argument is cynical.
However, this does not undermine its force, and in
fact may make it more effective at achieving desperately
needed outcomes than arguments based on charity, and
possibly even those based on justice. As noted, the health
policies of wealthy nations have historically emphasized
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cynical, short-term and regional interests, at significant
cost to both non-citizens, and to their own longer-term
interests. Our goal in this article has therefore been to
explain the importance of replacing a cynical and in-
creasingly inadequate approach to public health with
an instrumentalization of self-interest to move towards
an approach that, eventually, is based on solidarity, an
approach which is more suited to achieving global
health. Self-interest is a motivational tool on the way
to this approach; it is not a goal or an end in itself.
While the costs of effective responses to the threats
discussed are demanding, they are proportionate to the
risks they pose to all persons. Further, and importantly,
as we have sketched above, given the immediacy and
scale of the problem, people are increasingly likely to
be motivated to act, and to accept the costs of an ad-
equate response to these global health threats. For this to
actually happen, however, stronger efforts to publicize
the looming dangers of global health threats, as well as
the need for cooperative action to address them, are
necessary.
Finally, we do not mean to suggest that global health
solidarity that has been reached this way will resolve all
deprivations of health worldwide. Rather, our goal in
this article has been to show how in one aspect, solidar-
ity, based on an initially self-interested recognition of
similarity, can motivate a response to certain important
emerging global threats.
Thinking about global health, and particularly re-
sponses to the global health threats mentioned, in
terms of solidarity enables, and should motivate, us to
view the kinds of sacrifices needed to protect everyone
not as burdens imposed on ‘us’ to benefit ‘them’. Rather,
if we acknowledge the vulnerabilities we share with
other people (who we may previously have excluded
from consideration), and accept the existence of the
solidary relationships which exist between us, we can
instead view those sacrifices as the means to protect
‘us all’ (Baylis et al., 2008: 205).
Notes
1. Responses by wealthy countries to the recent Ebola
epidemic in West Africa were largely muted until
wealthy persons were affected (Caplan, 2014).
Further, responses tended to emphasize the need
to protect citizens of wealthy countries from dan-
gerous threats from overseas rather than on the
much greater needs of distant others.
2. Not to mention the fact that they also highlight ser-
ious questions of justice, as we briefly discuss.
3. EHTs include things like disease pathogens, envir-
onmental pollution, natural disasters and the vio-
lence of other persons. Environments which are
reasonably free of such threats need not be totally
devoid of such hazards (hence ‘reasonably free’), but
they will include features which minimize as far as is
reasonably possible, the risks associated with
common EHTs. For example, wealthy countries typ-
ically provide infrastructures such as vaccination
programmes, sanitation systems and the rule of
law, which are intended to protect citizens from
the risks posed by EHTs. In this article we focus
on those EHTs which more obviously relate to
health, infectious disease and environmental threats.
4. Solidarity in a global context has recently received
significant attention from a number of theorists
(Dean, 1996; Young, 2002; Scholz, 2008;
Eckenwiler et al., 2012; Krishnamurty, 2013;
Gould, 2014). While there are similarities between
the account presented here, there are also significant
differences. For reasons of space and scope, in this
article, we rely mainly on our account of solidarity
and do not contrast this with the work of other au-
thors; however, see (Prainsack and Buyx, 2016:
chapters 3 and 4).
5. These active and relational aspects of solidarity have
also been defined by other theorists as ‘“standing up
for”, “standing up with”, and “standing up as”’ other
persons with whom solidarity is identified (Jennings
and Dawson, 2015: 35).
6. See also (Baylis et al., 2008; Eckenwiler, 2012;
Eckenwiler et al., 2012).
7. See (Baylis et al., 2008) for an exception to this
trend.
8. This is not restricted to works that focus on global
health and solidarity (see discussions in Prainsack
and Buyx, 2012b, 2016; Dawson and Verweij, 2012;
Derpmann, 2013).
9. However, we do not mean to reject the cosmopol-
itan idea of the shared, innate moral value of all
persons. Instead, our goal in this article is to present
an alternative argument for increased investment in
global health which may appeal to those not con-
vinced by cosmopolitan commitments.
10. Importantly, we do not take actions which are en-
tirely motivated by self-interest to be instances of
solidarity. Instead, we take self-interest to be a start-
ing point, from which solidaristic identification can
be derived. We explain this point in more detail
below.
11. For example, an outbreak of multidrug-resistant
Acinetobacter baumannii at a hospital in Northern
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Germany infected 27 patients, contributing to 11
deaths (Borrud, 2015; Youth Health, 2015). See
also (Hosein et al., 2002: 91 s; Sandora and
Goldman, 2012; Gallagher, 2014).
12. While the health of citizens of both rich and poor
countries will be adversely affected by climate
change (and the latter are likely to be affected to a
greater extent), we focus in this section on the harms
to the wealthy, since our goal is to show how the
wealthy can be motivated to engage solidaristically
with the poor. Given that citizens of wealthy coun-
tries have typically enjoyed less precarious living en-
vironments than their counterparts in poor
countries (Mendelsohn et al., 2006), the shift can
also be seen as more immediately shocking for the
wealthy, since it represents a fundamental shift in
the kinds of harm they are exposed to, rather than an
exacerbation of an existing threat to health.
13. Though it is suggested that, as a result of infrastruc-
ture available to the wealthy, most increases in mor-
tality will remain amongst the world’s poorer
citizens (Semenza and Menne, 2009: 369). See also
(Semenza, 2014: 194–195; Confalonieri et al., 2015:
555).
14. The threats posed by these new globalized health
hazards are qualitatively different to those posed
by pandemic disease. The latter tend to be short
term and acute, while the former are long term,
chronic, structural and existential. Instead of ‘just’
a severe outbreak of a dangerous disease within an
existing global health paradigm, the new globalized
threats represent a paradigm shift in global health
threats.
15. Of course, prior to the advent of the antibiotic era,
both wealthy and poor people shared common vul-
nerability to infectious disease. However, then, as
now, vulnerability was exacerbated by poverty and
deprivation. While common vulnerability to infec-
tious diseases which were controlled during the anti-
biotic era is not entirely novel when compared to
human history as a whole, it does represent a radical
departure from the context experienced by wealthy
persons for the majority of the 20th century.
16. These ‘healthful environments’ can reasonably be
classified as public goods, since they will require col-
lective, cooperative participation by all members of
a given public to deliver and maintain, and once
established in a given region are both non-exclud-
able and non-rivalrous (Waldron, 1987: 304). For a
more detailed discussion of health public goods,
such as herd immunity, and the control of disease
vectors see (Hunter and Dawson, 2011: 86; West-
Oram, 2013; Widdows and West-Oram, 2013).
17. Between 1990 and 2010, the USA restricted entry for
persons living with HIV, to protect American public
health—a very recent example of isolationist health
policy (Gostin, 2014: 306).
18. Within a few months of the Nigerian state of Kano
ending its Polio vaccination programme, the disease
‘had spread to 7 neighbouring countries, and even-
tually on to 19 countries overall’ (Battin et al., 2009:
34). Given the speed and accessibility of global
travel, and the ease with which certain diseases
spread, to allow the resurgence of an infectious dis-
ease like Polio (or SARS, MERS, or H5N1 etc.) in
one part of the world is to pave the way for its re-
surgence elsewhere.
19. As noted above, domestic public health efforts such
as vaccination programmes are typically constructed
to extend their benefits to all persons in a given
region at least in part because of fear of the conse-
quences of failing to do so.
20. Even where aid programmes have ostensibly focused
on the needs of their beneficiaries in poor countries,
many implicitly assume a charitable relationship be-
tween donor and recipient. For example, roughly $1
billion of the Bush Administration’s Presidential
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was
reserved for abstinence only programmes (Pisani,
2008: 191–194). Such programmes have a failure
rate of around 72 per cent, even amongst wealthy
persons in communities which place great social
value on abstinence before marriage (Ibid). Not
only was this therefore a dramatic misuse of funds,
it also displays a worrying attitude on the part of
those allocating those funds—that they have the au-
thority over distant others (an important point of
difference between donor and beneficiary) to dictate
to persons in desperate need how they must live to
receive urgent care.
21. In a discussion of solidarity for the domestic con-
text, Baylis et al. attempt to move away from self-
interest as a foundation for solidarity, and argue that
solidarity should be grounded in a shared under-
standing of the relationality of persons in the do-
mestic context (Baylis et al., 2008: 203). While we
are sympathetic to this position, we wish to suggest
here that self-interest can serve as a valid and im-
portant catalyst for recognition of solidarity, espe-
cially at the global level, when relational solidarity,
as proposed by Baylis et al., may be harder to
perceive.
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22. For a discussion of self-interest and global solidarity
which complements that provided here, see
(Eckenwiler et al., 2012).
23. It must be emphasized that ‘shared’ here, as else-
where in the text, does not mean that rich and
poor country populations truly share the same or
a closely similar experience. Vulnerabilities and risks
are situated, and have contexts, and histories. What
we want to emphasize here is that there are SOME
important elements of threat and danger that can be
recognized as pertaining to both parties, even if the
overall experience remains vastly different. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to
our attention.
24. For a discussion of a range of examples showing the
inadequacies of isolationist health policy see (Smith
and Upshur, 2015).
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